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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This study on the transfer of American technologies to 
China's state-owned enterprise via Chinese public 
bureaucracy was conducted to examine a major variable 
ignored in the current U.S.-China business relationship: the 
functional roles played by China's technical public 
bureaucracies in the importation of Western technology.
This issue was chosen to be the focus because academics 
and practitioners in the fields of public administration and 
business management had not adequately addressed it, nor had 
they discussed the future consequences of the phenomenon. 
Furthermore, given the fact that some current studies on the
issue indicate more ad hominem arguments than convincing
statements, more bitterness and resentment than solution- 
oriented intention, the writer meant to present a more 
unbiased perception of the past.
The overall objective of this study was to increase the
awareness and understanding of the inevitable and crucial 
roles of Chinese public bureaucracy in the U.S.-China 
technology transfer. Through understanding, more objective 
rather than emotional alternatives could be developed for 
future transactions.
To accomplish the goal, methods of case study and 
literature research were employed. Specifically, the author
(1) analyzed two cases she studied on American technologies 
transferred from private businesses to Chinese end-users;
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
(2) presented a historical review of the types of 
technologies China imported in the past ten years from the 
West with a focus on the United States; (3) clarified what 
American businesses perceived to be the "short, unhappy 
romance" in their past operation in China; and (4) concluded 
the study with four recommended strategies for American 
businesses to cope with the dilemmas in their future 
interactions with Chinese technical bureaucracies. Each of 
these four aspects will be summarized in the following.
First, the writer presented two cases, "Who Actually 
Shot Grand" and "The Lucky BurryKing" to help gain a 
retrospective view of how technologies from private American 
businesses were transferred to Chinese end-users. The first 
case depicted China's national level bureaucratic procedure 
that contributed to Grand's loss of the $50 million bid 
after two years of business negotiation. Other elements 
discussed were: the complicated initiating procedures for 
technology importation, fragmented decision-making 
authorities among key bureaucracies of Beijing, how the 
foreign currency for importation was allocated, diffusion of 
responsibility among technical bureaucracies and the 
parental relationship between Chinese public bureaucracies 
and industrial end-users. The second case, "The Lucky 
BurryKing", described an effective technology transfer 
transaction between a Chicago business and a state-owned 
enterprise in Tianjin, China through a local Chinese
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
bureaucracy. It implied several variables that led to a 
successful transaction such as, targeting a key Chinese 
agent, selecting channels of communication, using an 
effective bureaucracy to get around superior and parallel 
bureaucracies.
Following the cases was a review of the US-China 
technology transfer operations in the past ten years. The 
United States, in the past ten years, has ranked the third 
major technology supplier to China after Hong kong, European 
Common Market and Japan. China, since its economic reform, 
has imported varieties of technologies from the U.S., from 
soft technologies such as intelligence, human resources, and 
management to the hard technologies of technology-intensive 
industrial equipment.
Given the extensive participation of American 
businesses in the Chinese market, American technology 
suppliers today related their last ten years of transactions 
with their Chinese partners as a "short-lived happy romance" 
"in the same bed but with different dreams". Some 
frustrated American businesses perceived their business 
operation in China to be "2+2=l/2", i.e., it costs twice as 
much and takes twice as long in China to make half the 
normal profits made elsewhere. Instead of affirming or 
rejecting those American views, the writer concluded two 
factors that had influenced Americans' perceptions: the 
incompatible goals and the unmatched business practices
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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between American technology suppliers and the Chinese 
government and end-users.
Responding to some future remedies recommended by some 
American academics, the writer analyzed three major dilemmas 
facing American businesses in their future interaction with 
Chinese public bureaucracies. They are (1) the intertwining 
of business opportunity and political instability in the 
China market; (2) the conflicts between the efficiency- 
oriented American private businesses and process-oriented 
Chinese bureaucracies ; and (3) the increased competition 
among fragmented Chinese governmental agencies in handling 
technology transfers.
In conclusion, the author presented and discussed four 
strategies for American businesses to overcome their 
language and cultural disparities and thus better survive 
Chinese bureaucracy. The first strategy, "seeking 
cooperation from the U.S. government", underlines the 
rationales and possible means of governmental involvement. 
The second suggestion, "targeting the right Chinese public 
agencies", describes three components of a right agency: (a)
profile of science and technology committee; (b) profile of 
a local agency; and (c) profile of an agent. The third 
alternative, "discovering China's informal information 
channels", leads Americans to the exploration of what 
constitutes the informal channels. The final strategy, 
"learning the high-context culture communication skills".
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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investigates some dysfunctional "American ways" exercised in 
the Chinese market and thus illustrates some coping skills.
The rationale behind these suggested strategies was 
conceived to balance the naive conceptual framework 
Americans had brought with them to the Chinese business 
environment.
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INTRODUCTION
The transfer of technologies from developed countries 
(DCs) to less developed countries (LDCs) has captivated the 
attention of the LDCs in their modern industrialization. 
China, as the largest developing country, has actively 
transferred technology from developed countries since the 
early 1980s during its economic reform.
The transfer process, however, has not been as 
promising and smooth as the technology suppliers had 
expected. One of the unexpected experiences for Americans is 
"the unpredictability of working within a Communist system" 
(Mann, 1989).
A typical characteristic of a "communist system" as 
opposed to a "capitalist system" is that operations of 
transferring foreign technologies to local users are carried 
out by public agencies rather than by end-users or private 
brokers. Therefore, the behavior of the Chinese public 
bureaucracy in technology transfer operations becomes the 
focus of this study.
The needs for this study assessed by the writer as 
follows. First, few research studies have provided a 
retrospective view of to what extent China's public 
bureaucracy controls and operates economic activities such 
as technology importation. Nor have the available studies 
reflected the consequences and dilemmas of such bureaucratic 
phenomena.
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Second, few studies conducted by American academics 
have placed adequate emphasis on three functions 
characteristic of Chinese public bureaucracy: the watchdog, 
policy-maker, and policy implementer. In contrast, U.S. 
public bureaucracy has only a watchdog role over the U.S. 
technology suppliers (Glinow; Schnepp & Bhambri, 1988). 
Hence, the unofficial network through which Chinese public 
agencies close transfers has seldom been open to scrutiny in 
the past.
Last, but not least, American businesses and academics 
have not paid enough attention to the consequences of their 
"giving-and-taking” model in international technology 
transfer. This model implies that "we as technology 
suppliers have every right to set the rules". As this study 
shows, rules are set by the business environment where the 
technology is transferred.
Given the above assessed needs, this study is designed 
to achieve three goals. First, through two case studies, 
American businesses will become more aware of the functional 
roles played by the Chinese public agencies in transferring 
western technology to Chinese end-users. Moreover, some 
negative impressions held by Americans toward Chinese 
businesses may be altered through a retrospective review of 
Sino-U.S. operations in the past ten years. Finally, with 
an understanding of some future dilemmas in doing business 
with centrally planned economic systems American businesses
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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may develop coping strategies.
The organization of the present study reflects the 
writer's belief that only when American businesses are 
equipped with the "know-how" (coping strategies) as well as 
the "know-why" (philosophies implied), the "know-me" 
(perception of self) and the "know-thee" (perception of 
Chinese), can they make full use of their potential in an 
international market. Accordingly, four chapters are 
developed.
The first chapter, "Technology Transfer In Action", 
presents two cases on Sino-US technology transfers operated 
by Chinese public bureaucracies. Next, Chapter Two, "Sino- 
U.S. Technology Transfer In Retrospective", reviews current 
literature on technology, technology transfer, and Sino-U.S. 
technology transfer transactions in the 1980s. Chapter 
three and four are the focus of this study. Chapter three. 
Same Bed, Different Dreams: Realities Americans Discovered, 
discusses the two cases and the writer's arguments against 
some misconceptions. Chapter four examines some problems 
existing between American businesses and their Chinese 
partners with a focus on bureaucratic operations. The 
writer concludes the study by analyzing some future dilemmas 
facing American businesses in their interactions with 
centrally planned economic systems and four possible coping 
strategies.
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1 2
CHAPTER ONE Technology Transfer In Action^
Abstract
Sino-U.S. technology transfer is especially 
difficult because the operation is between a 
market in which private business owns, controls 
and allocates resources and a system where public 
agencies control and allocate resources for end- 
users. The two cases on Sino-US technology 
transfer studied by the writer in 1986, a $50 
million hot-strip mill bid and a technical 
cooperation project, describe the bureaucratic 
procedures and operations. They may serve to 
illustrate both the difficulties encountered by 
American businesses in China and, more broadly, 
the general pattern of interaction between a 
private corporation and a Communist economic 
system.
Case 1, Who Actually Shot George Grand?
"No one can believe itI The two-year-negotiation ended 
up a fiasco," George Grand, President of the America Iron & 
Steel Corporation (AI&S) came on strong. It was an autumn 
morning in 1985 at the Great Wall Hotel in Beijing, capital 
of the People’s Republic of China. Mr. Wu Ming, project 
director from the Ministry of Metallurgical Industry (MMI) 
located in Beijing, had just officially informed G r a n d ’s 
four-member-team that they missed the $50-million bid for 
the hot-strip plant technology. The bid was invited by the 
Ministry in 198 3 through the China Technology Import &
Export Corporation, a parallel public agency in Beijing.
^Both cases presented in Chapter One were studied by the writer 
stween 1986-1988. They were based on real business incidents except 
11 names of the businesses and personnel involved were disguised 
Dr the purpose of protection. The study methods included unofficial 
iterviews with the key management personnel concerned and review 
f business files.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
13
Grand was also informed that a German company took the bid
at $4 5 million with the same services package Grand had
offered. Grand confronted Mr. W u :
What shocked us is that negotiations for this bid 
had lasted two years until a moment ago when we 
were told we missed it. Were the decision made 
earlier, this could be the moment we say "Gan 
Bei", wine in glass, celebrating the profits we 
both made from the project. Or, my corporation 
could have been somewhere else. I would like to 
repeat again what I mentioned at the very 
beginning of this marathon negotiation, that it 
would take only three months to make this strip- 
mill profitable. Unfortunately, no action had 
been taken. Instead, two years were wasted at 
this bargaining table ! It is just foreign to me 
how the numerous trips by my colleagues and my 
five personal visits to your country for the bid 
led to a nothing (Li, interview with Q. Han, 
coordinator of the project, on December 9, 1987)!
The glaring eye contact from Grand at Mr. Wu intensified the
embarrassing silence. The rest of Grand's team had a moment
to go through some new name cards from that day's Chinese
team, a phenomenon Grand would call "a constant hassle of
matching cards and titles to the ever-changing Chinese
negotiation staffs."
Background information. The year 1985 was the fourth
of China's full-scale economic reform aimed at the
realization of four modernizations by the year 2000 (i.e.
the modernization of agriculture, industry, science and
technology, and national defense). 1985 was also the end of
China's sixth Five-Year-Plan, according to which industrial
adaptation and modernization of the existing industries was
given priority. Some heavy industries, such as turn-key
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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projects, technology-intensive equipment and production 
systems, were among the privileged lines to technology 
importation (Johnston & Li, 1988) .
The direct recipient of the hot-strip mill technology 
was the Northeast Iron & Steel Complex Import & Export 
Corporation (Northeast hereafter), a state-owned economic 
entity located in the northeast of China with 150,000 life­
time employees. Northeast is one of the four leading iron 
and steel industries in China subsidized by the Ministry of 
Metallurgical Industry. Northeast enjoyed a double­
privileged status as being both a heavy industry and as a 
prioritized government subsidiary. Accordingly, it was 
entitled to foreign currency appropriation for modern 
technology importation.
An opportunity came for Northeast in 1982. MMI 
required Northeast to initiate an import package in order 
for MMI to obtain annual foreign currency appropriation from 
the National Economics Planning Committee. Northeast 
proposed an importation package, a technology-intensive hot 
strip system. The technology would modify the existing 
technology structure designed in the early 197 0s.
MMI controls the nation's metallurgical industry under 
China's centrally planned economy. Since heavy industry has 
been the base of China's industry since the founding of 
People's Republic, MMI started importation of mining 
technologies from the United States, West Germany and Japan
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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in 1977, four years before the urban economic reforms.
Transfer operations. The importation of this $50 
million technology followed a well-established chain of 
command and clear-cut division of labor among public 
agencies. As with any costly importation project, it was the 
responsibility of the potential end-user to initiate a sound 
importation proposal prior to foreign currency appropriation 
in the capital. Accordingly, Northeast underwent its in- 
house procedure before the proposal reached MMI.
First, the headquarter of Northeast required its 
technicians at the current hot-strip plant to submit a 
technical proposal for the imported technology. The 
proposal would enable MMI to be eligible and competitive as 
a foreign-technology-recipient at a round-the-board foreign 
currency allocation in Beijing. Specifically, the proposal 
justified the necessity, urgency, technological functions, 
anticipated cost and benefit of the needed technology, as 
well as desired suppliers.
Second, the plant technicians were required to submit 
their research proposal to the technology department of the 
plant. Data included a tentative feasibility study of the 
needed technology. An in-plant technical debate followed. 
The proposal, as approved by the technology department, was 
later transferred to the chief executive of the plant, who 
brought it to an extended executive meeting for collective 
approval.
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The executive management of the hot-strip-plant, upon 
consensus, delivered the passed package to Northeast 
headquarters for further technical debate, scientific tests 
and collective decisions at the corporate management level. 
The headquarters, therefore, initiated the following 
procedures within its own staff and functional departments. 
Specifically, the Equipment Department executive held an 
extended collective decision-making session presented by 
staffs from the departments of Planning, Technology, and 
Finance. Staffs from the hot-strip plant were also given a 
seat. Two major goals were attained at this senior level: a 
comprehensive technical justification of the proposed 
technology and a documented importation proposal for MMI in 
Beij ing.
MMI presented the original package from Northeast to 
the China National Planning Committee for foreign currency 
budget appropriation. The Planning Committee, having 
approved the project with an allocation of 50 million U.S. 
dollars subsidy, authorized China National Technology 
Import & Export Corporation (China Tech. hereafter) to 
invite bids from overseas.
China Tech., a public technical agency in Beijing, is 
authorized by the National Economics Planning Committee to 
be in charge of any technology importation of at least three 
million U.S. dollars. The agency shoulders total 
responsibility for conducting business negotiations and
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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contracting. The bid was put to market in 1983 by China 
Tech. for MMI and Northeast. Since China Tech. was not 
affiliated with the technology recipient, Northeast was 
excluded from the negotiating table in Beijing.
Nevertheless, the end-user was entitled to be kept informed 
of the negotiation process by China Tech., as Northeast had 
final decision power over contracting terms, excluding the 
price. This meant Northeast was capable of accepting, 
rejecting, and/or modifying any contract terms other than 
price. In this sense, China Tech. played the role of 
negotiator for Northeast who was behind the scenes.
Negotiations with the bidding foreign technology 
suppliers started in 198 3 in Beijing. The Chinese team was 
staffed by technical bureaucrats from China Tech. and 
administrative bureaucrats from MMI. The early birds for 
the bid were three leading American corporations: General 
United Corp., V. Steel Corp., and America Iron & Steel 
Corp. Non-U.S. competitors included AEC, a West German 
company, and three Japanese Corporations. Due to 
Northeast's preference for American and Germany businesses, 
the America Iron & Steel Corp. and the German AEC were 
selected to enter into formal negotiations.
Led by Grand, the four-member team of AI&S made their 
first business trip to Beijing in 1983. Senior leaders from 
MMI gave them a tour of Northeast. Grand was very much 
impressed by the hospitality and the technical
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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sophistication of the Northeast technicians and its 
management. He also found that Northeast had been well 
connected with some American businesses from whom it 
imported technologies. In the words of a Chinese 
technician, "We enjoyed most the American technicians, their 
humor and people-oriented training techniques." Based on 
his impressions from this first trip, Grand felt greatly 
(and, it turned out, falsely) encouraged that he could 
eventually win the bid. Grand's people were extremely proud 
of their state-of-the-art hot-strip mill technology in the 
US, and their technical service including training and 
consultation, which caught the attention and interest of the 
Northeast management and its technicians.
Grand led four more trips to Beijing between late 19 8 3 
and autumn 1985, and had dozens of negotiating sessions with 
China Tech. During each phase of the negotiations, the 
Chinese replaced staff including translators, technicians, 
and decision-makers, depending on the sophistication of the 
technology required in each phase of the negotiations.
Grand was very proud of his 4-member team except he did not 
have a bilingual interpreter as his Chinese counterpart had.
After his third trip to China in late 1984, Grand 
foresaw a positive outcome for AI&S Corp. because China 
Tech. and the end-user had expressed their satisfaction with 
the modern technology, services, and fringe benefits 
offered. Moreover, details such as phases of technical
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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service, training etc,. had been discussed and agreed upon. 
Grand's team had been cordially received by Chinese higher 
administrators in Beijing such as the director of the 
Ministry of Economic & Trade Relations, the Minister of MMI, 
the President of China Tech and the President and executives 
of Northeast. Each of these bureaucracies had held banquets 
for Grand's team. Grand was very impressed by the Chinese 
hospitality. However, he had been bothered by the tough and 
tedious bargaining by his counterpart over the price. He 
had no clue what made those Chinese bureaucrats bargain so 
hard over the price. He was confident that his technology 
was sophisticated and services unbeatable.
Whenever Grand started accusing the Chinese bureaucrats 
of being laymen, Davidson, liaison for the project, would 
try to calm him down by assuring him that the bargaining was 
only a negotiation tactic of the Chinese. Davidson further 
argued that Northeast highly appreciated their package and 
never complained about the cost. "The Northeast people told 
me they had the final say whether they want the technology 
or not," Davidson was also very confident because he had 
developed "Guanxi" (favorable personal relationship) at 
Northeast.
Grand took for granted that the contract would be 
signed during this trip. Director Wu from MMI, cigarette 
in hand, responded to Grand's confrontation through his 
translator:
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We feel very sorry for your loss. As a matter of 
fact, we appreciate as much your sincerity in 
cooperation as your technology and service. Had 
there been some compromise on the price from your 
corporation, the deal could have been made long 
ago. We Chinese have an old saying, friendship is 
developed even though the business deal is not 
made. We believe there will be more opportunities 
for cooperation in the near future since we are 
old friends now.
We have arranged a trip for your team to Xian 
to visit the recently excavated underground 
Forbidden City where is buried the first Chinese 
Emperor Qin Shi, who united China in B.C. 221 (Li, 
personal interview with Q. Han, coordinator of the 
project, on December 9, 1987).
Grand boarded that afternoon's flight for San 
Francisco.
Case 2, The Lucky BurryKing
THIS TECHNICAL SALES REPRESENTATIVE AGREEMENT is 
made as of this 1st day of December, 198 6 by and 
between BurryKing, a Chicago corporation, and The 
Tianjin Science and Technical Exchange Center 
(TSTEC), Tianjin, People's Republic of China....
This Agreement constitutes the entire agreement 
between BurryKing and TSTEC, and all written or 
oral agreements, representations or understandings 
of any kind that may have been made prior to the 
date hereof shall be deemed to have been 
superseded by the terms of this agreement....^
The transfer of BurryKing's technology was completed by 
a Chinese local public bureaucracy, TSTEC (Tianjin Center 
hereafter) located in Tianjin, China's third largest 
industrial city. The importation included BurryKing's 
special bearings, its technical training services and
^Based on the draft file obtained by mail from the Tianjin Center, 
irch, 1988.
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periodic consultation- The end-user was a leading state- 
owned engineering industry in Tianjin, the Tianjin Machinery 
Manufacturer.
By the end of 1986, two engineers from Tianjin had 
completed two months training in Chicago by BurryKing and 
returned to Tianjin to work as technical representatives of 
BurryKing. By 1988, with the imported special bearings, 
technical service and consultation, the recipient had 
manufactured a new model of engine, and marketed both 
domestically and internationally. In October, 1988, 
BurryKing and TS&TEC renewed their previous two-year 
contract.
Background information. Tianjin Center is a self­
claimed non-governmental public agency. In reality, it is a 
direct subordinate branch of the Department of Science & 
Technology of Tianjin. Its 15 staff members are salaried 
governmental employees, recruited and assigned to it by the 
Dept, of Science & Technology of Tianjin. Its business 
operation is a mixture of centrally planned economy and 
market economy. For example, the center does not charge 
consulting and service fees from their local clients, mostly 
government-owned enterprises. It charges foreign 
businesses, however, for any services. The consulting fees 
paid in foreign currency are turned in to the local 
government of Tianjin.
The technical functions of Tianjin Center reflect the
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main stream of China's open-door policies in economic 
reforms. Specifically, it acts as a liaison agency bridging 
the West with Tianjin industry in the field of technology 
transfer. It facilitates information exchange between 
technology suppliers and recipients. Apart from being a 
liaison and an information center, Tianjin Center, above 
all, is one of the authorized legal representatives for the 
city of Tianjin.
Retrospective transfer activity. Early in 1984, a 
three-member business delegation was sent on a fact-finding 
mission by the Tianjin city government. They visited the 
University of Chicago, its science center, the Business 
Association of Chicago and some industrial manufacturers.
In the previous two weeks, the delegation had traveled to 
five eastern states of the United States, visiting twelve 
cities and dozens of industrial manufacturers. This 
delegation included the general manager and the assistant 
manager of Tianjin Center, both of whom had B.S. degrees in 
engineering and knowledge of English. A translator, 
recently graduated from college, accompanied them. Their 
mission, as Li Ruihuan, the Mayor of Tianjin defined it, was 
to further open Tianjin to the U.S. market by discovering 
and developing more opportunities for bilateral technology 
transfers.
"Their efficiency beats us Americans," the director of 
the Ohio State Technology Transfer Center said, expressing
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his admiration of the group. The President of Modern 
Machinery Industry in New York complimented the group, 
saying :" In the past several years of China's economic 
reform, I have received numerous delegations sent by China. 
So far, this is the only efficient and effective group 
including no laymen" (Li, personal interview with S. Li on 
May 1, 1986).
By the end of their three-week trip in the United 
States, the group had gathered information on several 
American industries that would be qualified for bilateral 
technology transfer with Chinese end-users. BurryKing Corp. 
in Chicago impressed the group most for its technology, 
service, and consulting staff. The executive management of 
BurryKing demonstrated their company's high potential for 
being a committed technology supplier to Tianjin.
On returning to Tianjin, the delegation reported on 
their visit to the mayor. It was not long before the center 
started taking action to realize potential transfers. To 
start with, the assistant manager was personally in charge 
of matching the interested American suppliers to potential 
end-users in Tianjin. He distributed all the catalogs 
brought with him from the trip to concerned industries in 
Tianjin for feedback. In the case of BurryKing, several 
catalog recipients contacted the center expressing their 
interest in BurryKing's technology package for the purpose 
of modeling a new generation engine.
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In the second step, the assistant manager scrutinized 
the current public policies on technology importation. 
Between 1983 and 1986, Chinese government policies 
encouraged the most rapid economic reforms since 1949. 
According to the assistant manager, "there are many possible 
interpretations of policies, as well as loopholes in each of 
them, hence one can always avoid being caught later."
Having the governmental codes on his table to justify his 
action, the assistant manager took the total responsibility 
to screen and decide which applicants should be financed 
through bank loans. He set the following five criteria for 
the end-users of BurryKing's technology: (a) the applicant
must be a prioritized business in Tianjin industry to get 
financed by the state-owned bank; (b) it must have 
credibility in debt liability; (c) a sound management crew 
was a prerequisite; (d) it should have a certain percentage 
share in the domestic market; and (e) the feasibility study 
submitted by the applicant should demonstrate its ability to 
absorb the new technology.
During the third phase, Tianjin Center conducted step- 
by-step business promotions to bridge BurryKing, as well as 
other American businesses, to the concerned Tianjin 
industries. First, the assistant manager and his assistant 
held a city-wide press conference introducing the American 
businesses to representatives from Tianjin industries.
Being a high level government agency in Tianjin, the center
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had access to other governmental agencies in Tianjin and in 
Beijing. Invited to the conference were representatives 
from the c ity’s industrial manufacturers, key bureaucrats 
from related industrial bureaus, and academics from 
technology research centers, concerned colleges and research 
institutes.
Next, Tianjin Center forwarded the feedback from the 
conference to BurryKing and other American technology 
suppliers. Soon, the center arranged for suppliers from the 
U.S. to come to meet the potential recipients in Tianjin, in 
the presence of people from the center.
After a scientific feasibility study conducted by the 
center (actually by the assistant manager himself) on behalf 
of the end—user, the center submitted a documented study 
report to the Tianjin Science & Technology Committee for 
bank loan approval. Two factors crucially influenced the 
approval from the committee, the technology absorption and 
debt liability of the user. With the documented approval, 
the center began working with concerned public sectors 
controlling the state-owned banks to obtain a foreign 
currency loan. "The bank trusts the center, not the 
individual user. It is much more efficient and effective for 
me to get the loan for the user than for the user to get it 
itself," said the assistant manager (Li, telephone interview 
with the assistant manager on December 20, 1988).
After twenty months of work, the transfer was
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contracted. To close the transaction, Tianjin Center 
formalized in written form its future responsibility and 
accountability to BurryKing and the user. Some of the 
center's responsibilities include: to (a) advertise 
BurryKing's technology in China; (b) testify to the quality, 
modernity, sophistication, and feasibility of absorption of 
the technologies to be transferred; (c) screen Chinese sales 
representative for BurryKing; (d) keep Burryking informed 
and (e) charge consulting fees.
On being interviewed privately, the assistant manager 
who personally initiated and accomplished the above business 
activities reflected:
As a manager of a public agency, I've got to 
know what is unknown to the public. In order to 
get something done, I need to abide by 
governmental regulations to protect myself from 
being caught later. In the meantime, I have to 
get around both superior and subordinate 
bureaucracies to be efficient. BurryKing 
complained the deal took twenty months. What they 
d o n 't know is that had it not been me who has had 
12 years experience in dealing with technical 
bureaucracies at local and national level to 
handle the case, the BurryKing deal could have 
gone up in smoke.
What's more, I am a self-motivated patriot.
The whole deal was completed with only my bicycle 
as transportation. Efficiency is in the eye of 
the beholder (Li, telephone interview with the 
assistant manager on December 20, 1988).
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CHAPTER TWO Sino-US Technology Transfer In Retrospective
Abstract
Two cases are presented in the previous 
chapter as an aid to understanding technology 
transfer channels in China. This chapter 
introduces (a) the concepts of technology and its 
international transfer ; and (b) the technologies 
that have been transferred to China through its 
public bureaucracies.
A. Concepts of Technology and Its International Transfer
Technology has been increasingly transferred to China 
from developed countries in the 1980s. The prevailing 
academic discussions on the technology structure indicate a 
more diversified and sophisticated conceptualization of 
today's technology than is commonly perceived. The 
following summarizes some recent arguments.
Technology is defined, by some, as "know-how" or the 
sum of knowledge, experience and skill necessary for 
establishing an enterprise and for manufacturing a product 
economically. While this definition may be adequate for 
many purposes, it should be noted that technology needs to 
be viewed not only as the specific process or manufacturing 
technology, but also as various other types of knowledge and 
expertise necessary for the planning, establishing, and 
operation of a plant (Aggarwal, 1988). Technology, be it 
the form of tangible products, or concepts and information, 
is seen as value-laden. "It reflects, in design, operation, 
and inherent expectations about its utilization and 
advantages, the culture in which it was conceived" (Fischer,
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1988). Technology is also "the knowledge about managerial 
actions that has application in a business setting" (Aharoni 
& Sticht, 1988). In the most tangible forms, technology can 
be turnkey projects, plant technology, infrastructure and 
specific machinery. In the intangible forms, technology can 
be "intelligence, technical consulting services, education, 
training, and even free information carried in literature" 
(Liu, 1988) .
Large-scale transfer of the technologies defined above 
did not happen in global settings until the 1950s—  
especially after the creation of the European Economic 
Community. Transferring technologies internationally has 
been a hotly debated issue provoking high emotions among 
supplier and recipient countries.
Americans did not realize the consequences when they 
transferred steel industry technology to Japan in the 1950s 
and 1960s. The technology recipient, Japan, became a strong 
international market competitor to America in the 197 0s and 
1980s (Gold, 1988). Given the consequences, it is not 
surprising that some American academics advocate technology 
protection. For example, when China publicly claimed at the 
United Nations in 1982 that science and technology are "part 
of the universal human heritage, which should be shared by 
all countries, particularly developing countries" (Simon, 
1984, p.301) Denies Simmon, a technology consultant with 
American and Chinese governmental agencies criticized the
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Chinese view in the following.
These Chinese responses reflect both a naive 
understanding and somewhat paradoxical view of 
science and technology. From an economic 
standpoint, the Chinese position reflects a lack 
of appreciation for the costs associated with 
research and development activities and for the 
value of proprietary knowledge as a commercially 
marketable good. From a governmental standpoint, 
domestic or multilateral regulations adopted by 
other nations to control technology outflows to 
protect their own perceived security interests 
have been poorly received in Beijing (Simon, 1984, 
p.301).
Disparate as the political and economic perspectives of 
the international transfer of technology seem to be, 
technology suppliers have been well aware of the fact that 
the international transfer is a complex process, by which 
expertise or knowledge related to some aspect of technology 
and operations is passed on from one culture to another 
(Aggarwal, 1988). The process of transfer is considered to 
be the communication, adaptation, and use of technology from 
one economic region to a second region. It is further 
recognized that technology transfer is not simply the 
reproduction of an identical enterprise in a second area, 
but an adaptation of the original which has been modified to 
fit that second region's peculiar social, political, 
technical, climatological, economic, and educational 
environment (Aharoni, 1988) .
China, as a recipient of technology from developed 
countries, as well as a technology supplier in certain 
fields, has been engaged in literally all forms of
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technology importation during its economic reform in the 
1980s. The following summarizes its technology importation.
B . China As A Radical Technology Recipient In The 1980s 
Governmental treaties and cooperative projects. As
noticed by some Westerners in the 1980s that "never before 
in the history of the Communist regime has the Chinese 
leadership been so actively engaged in bilateral and 
international science and technology activities" (Simon, 
1984, p. 234). According to the information released 
through an overseas journal, Chinese Scholars Overseas in 
May 1988 by the China Science & Technology Committee in 
Beijing, China had signed bilateral science and technology 
cooperation agreements with almost all the major 
industrialized countries during its economic reform. These 
formal agreements have been complemented by a myriad of 
nonofficial, informal cooperative relationships with 
commercial firms, professional societies, e t c . In the area 
of international science and technology transfer, the 
Chinese government had signed formal agreements with 2 6 
developed countries. At the nongovernmental level, many 
Chinese local administrations (equivalent to states, 
counties and cities of the U.S.) had signed contracts for 
technology exchange with the West. Among them, 4 6 contracts 
went to West Germany, 4 4 to France, 2 7 to the United States 
and 18 to Great Britain (Wu, 1988) .
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China's dramatic shift from her three-decade practice 
of "third world orientation" to the present "developed 
country orientation" in international platforms is 
interpreted by Americans as "a radical departure from 
Beijing's past practice of 'politics in command'" (Simon, 
1984, p.297). China's embrace of imported technology also 
indicated that after three decades of turning her back to 
the West, China's current domestic science and technology 
capabilities were insufficient to meet the pressing demands 
of modernity, especially those generated by the current 
economic reform.
Intelligence and expertise. Apart from governmental 
treaties and projects, the transferring of western expertise 
and intelligence to local businesses, the public sector, and 
colleges sparked a "booming" period in the mid- and late- 
1980s. After several years of experiments in economic 
reform, the Chinese government started shifting its emphasis 
from importation of "eggs" (hardware technology such as 
machinery) to "chickens" (software technology such as 
management knowledge). The technology of intelligence and 
expertise has been imported by China in eclectic forms, 
ranging from foreign-profiled consulting services, 
management training, and free technical training attached to 
industrial transactions, to non-Chinese management skills 
possessed by foreign stockholders in joint venture 
businesses located in China; from educational exchange
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
3 2
programs to free information exchanged in literature.
One of the major factors impelling China's transfer of 
this type of "software technology" is an intention to remedy 
her earlier overemphasis on "tangible technology 
importation": complete plants, production lines etc. With 
this conceptual framework, China has invested in such areas 
as the following.
Consulting service, another form of transferring 
foreign "soft" technology, appears to be very promising 
although still new to China. The pioneer in this field, the 
International Technology Consulting Corporation (Inter-Tech) 
located in Tianjin, was established in 1987. This 
Singapore-based business, coordinated by the Tianjin Science 
& Technology Commission, is staffed both by American 
technical professionals and local experts, whose job is 
providing scientific and technical consulting services to 
foreign technology suppliers as well as to Chinese end- 
users .
Management training is taken by local and governmental 
Chinese agencies as an effective channel for transferring 
modern western theories and practices to Chinese economic 
entities. The formal transfer originated in the late 197 0s 
when the United States, at the invitation of Beijing, set up 
the first training center in China, the Sino-US Dalian 
Training Center. For eight months each year, business 
executives and American intellectuals from selected
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universities go to Dalian, a northern coastal city of China, 
to lecture and conduct seminars for management 
professionals, teaching faculties and graduate students 
selected from major industrial cities of China. George 
Schultz, U.S. Secretary of State, spoke highly of the 
training center during his 1986 visit, accompanied by the 
then Chinese President Deng Xiaoping.
Educational exchange had been conducted not only by 
universities but also by Chinese local public agencies. 
China's MEA (Management Enterprise Association), for 
example, has affiliates in every major industrial city in 
China. Each subordinate MEA has attracted individual 
professionals from developed countries to offer regular 
classes, lectures or workshops on management. According to 
the U.S. State Department's Bureau of Public Affairs, 
hundreds of scientific and technological delegations visited 
China between 1980 and 1988 under the auspices of America's 
science and technology accord, the largest accord the US has 
ever had. On the other hand, about 80,000 Chinese students 
and scholars came to the United States between 197 9 and 
1989. Of those, about 43,000 remain in the U.S. today, 
forming the largest bloc of foreign students on American 
university campuses (Mann, 1990).
The employment of foreign executives to run Chinese 
government-owned industrial businesses opens another channel 
for transference of managerial knowledge to Chinese
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enterprises. The first non-Chinese chief executive, a 
German engineer, took a management position in 198 2 in the 
city of Wuhan. In that major industrial city, the German 
successfully managed a Chinese government-owned engine 
manufacturer. Subsequently, the first Japanese executive 
was hired in July 1988 to manage another Chinese government- 
owned enterprise, Dalian Power Plant in the north (People's 
Daily, June 22, 1988).
Joint-ventures and foreign-ventures. The China-western 
joint business ventures located in China "provide foreign 
capital, advanced technology, modern managerial skills, and 
access to international markets" (Liberthal & Prahalad,
1988). Despite being a most problematic and hotly-debated 
subject among foreign stockholders, joint-ventures have 
taken a considerable portion of imported technology. 
According to a Chinese governmental organ. People's Daily, 
China had about 6000 joint-ventures with foreign partners by 
July 1988. One hundred and eight ventures were located in 
Beijing. The year of 1988 saw some 600 American small and 
medium-sized businesses heading for China seeking further 
opportunities for joint-venture. In addition, about 18 0 
wholly foreign-owned ventures operate in China (Liberthal & 
Prahalad, 1988) and about 600 U.S.-Chinese joint ventures 
have been established (Gladstone, 1989) .
Technology-intensive equipment. Plant technology and 
infrastructure contributed a considerable percentage of
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China's import volume in the past decade, when $3 0 billion 
was spent on importing foreign technologies. The imported 
technology led to a sixty percent increase in China's annual 
output (Huang, 1988). After several years of 
experimentation, shifted its focus from transferring 
complete plants to acquiring soft technologies, as mentioned 
earlier in this chapter. In addition, Beijing gave 
preference to the acquisition of new and sophisticated 
materials and selected advanced equipment and components 
from technology suppliers (Simmon, p.303). Beijing's 
importation strategy shift was intended to accomplish three 
things : (a) to speed up the pace of China's modernization;
(b) to further modify and adapt the existing industrial 
structures; and (c) to more effectively meet domestic 
consumer demands.
Guided by the new orientation toward importation of 
sophisticated technology, China transferred modern 
telecommunication technology to its own research and 
development system. The result of this transfer, the China 
Post reports, was a 74 per cent success rate in applying R & 
D results to the domestic market. The technology 
application has enhanced telecommunications in over twenty 
major cities in China since 1984 (Staff, 1988).
Regarding the second importation orientation, toward 
domestic industrial modification and adaptation, the $50 
billion bid case in the first chapter has illustrated its
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significance. The third importation strategy, transferring 
foreign technology to ease domestic consumption pressure, is 
illustrated by the importation of a piano manufacturing 
system from Sweden by a Chinese government-owned industry 
(Reporter, July, 22, 1988). The Liaoning Piano 
Manufacturer, one of China's four piano producers, purchased 
for $750,000 an entire manufacturing system from a 
bankrupted leading Swedish piano manufacturer. The 
importation was to ease increasing domestic demand, as the 
possession of a piano by a modern urban nuclear family had 
become a symbol of "family modernization".
According to some westerners' observations, China's 
shift of strategy on foreign technology importation 
"reflects China's increased sophistication in selecting 
international technologies" (Simmon, 1986,).
Given the active involvement of the Chinese public 
bureaucracy with the United States and other developed 
countries, what have been the consequences and reflections 
from both the suppliers and the recipient? In the next 
chapter, discussions and reflections from Academic and 
practitioners perspectives will be evaluated and the 
writer's critique presented.
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Chapter Three Same Bed, Different Dreams; Realities
Americans Discovered
Abstract
Regarding the past ten years technology transfer 
from the U.S. to China and present reflection on 
the transfer operations, the author raises two 
arguments in this chapter. First, American 
businesses rushed to China with misconceptions 
imposed by governmental leaders of both sides and 
cultural legacies. Second, the underestimation of 
the functional roles played by Chinese public 
bureaucracy contributed to Americans' present 
negative impression of the past experience with 
China. The arguments are supported by an analysis 
of the two cases studied in chapter one and 
findings from a selected literature.
A. The "Gold Rush”
So many American businesses rushing to China was an 
unprecedented phenomenon in the history of both countries. 
Two important factors contributed to the "gold rush": the 
governmental images and the conventional wisdom and culture 
possessed by American businesses.
Goverzuttental images. What China had done during the 
1980s was a grand experiment in her own history. The third 
president of China's Communist regime (1978-1989), Deng 
Xiaoping "not only permitted but invited, indeed encouraged. 
Western corporations to join hands with Chinese state 
enterprises in his effort to reform China's economy"
(Mann,1990, p.135).
The Chinese leader's determination to modernize China 
was affirmed in 197 8, the first year of China's economic 
reform. According to published information provided by the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
3 8
U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, China's 
ten-year plan (1978-1988) envisioned massive imports of 
complete plants and technology from the West. By the end of 
1978, China had signed contracts committing itself to 
foreign purchases totaling $7 billion (Punnett, 1989, 
p . 153) .
However, the radical and ambitious importation plan 
caused domestic disorders such as budget deficits, extensive 
capital construction and problems in controlling inflation. 
As a result, a strong austerity plan was in effect by the 
end of 1978. China canceled many foreign contracts.
Following dramatic economic growth from 1981 to 1985,  ̂
importation of advanced technology and equipment from abroad 
was ranked a priority for China's 1987 to 1991 plan 
(Punnett, 1989, p.155). China had depicted a rosy picture 
to the West of its economic reform.
The American government reciprocated with similar 
enthusiasm. When President Reagan visited China in April 
1984, he declared that China was only "so-called communist". 
Also at that time, an administration spokesman told the 
White House press corps that Western businesses would earn 
"megabucks" in China. The Reagan administration in 1984 
held out the prospect of China's purchasing twelve nuclear
^According to information provided by Hong Kong: Economist
telliaence Unit (1986-87, p.18), the target gross of industrial 
tput for 1981-1985 was 4% of annual average growth in reaL terms, 
e actual output was 12.6%. Moreover, the 3.8% targeted national 
come was replaced by the 9.8% actual growth.
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power plants within the next few years (Mann, 1989) .
Conventional wisdom and cultural legacy. "Americans 
heeded the China call largely as the centuries-old Western 
desire to penetrate and capture the vast China market, now 
one billion people" (Mann, 1989, p.25). This motivation 
recalls the same dream that has beguiled Western companies 
since the Industrial Revolution, exemplified by this 
statement from a British writer more than 150 years ago: "If 
we could only persuade every person in China to lengthen his 
shirttail by a foot, we could keep the mills of Lancashire 
working round the clock" (Mann, 1989, p.25).
Americans in the mid-198 0s were convinced by the reform 
image of the Chinese leaders that the Chinese were eager to 
embrace American-style capitalism (with its concomitant 
reality of unemployment, bankruptcies, and wide disparities 
in income) (Mann, 1989, p.58) American businesses, thus, 
wanted to bring about revolutionary changes in American- 
Chinese business relations; they wanted to compete with 
their international rivals by gaining a share in that 1.1 
billion population market with its inexpensive labor. The 
adventurous and committed Americans wanted to be the first 
to get into China in a big way; they believed that the 
industrial miracle which happened in their own land could be 
transplanted to China's system.
The consequence was that in the mid-19 8 0s, "American 
business interest in China was virtually limitless, and
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there were, indeed, few companies, entrepreneurs, lawyers, 
or investors who weren't thinking, dreaming, or scheming 
about getting something started in China" (Mann, 1989, p.5). 
American Motors Corporation set up the first model joint 
venture, Beijing Jeep, in the capital of China. In 1985 
alone U.S. companies rushed to form more than 800 joint 
ventures with state-owned enterprises in China, compared 
with only about 9 00 in the previous five years. Real, 
financial commitments were not made by the Chinese partners 
(Pye, 1986). Another 6000 American small and medium 
businesses followed their fellow gold seekers to Beijing in 
1988, seeking business opportunities. By 1989, the U.S. has 
established 600 joint ventures in China, taking fourteen per 
cent of foreign investment in China and ranking as one of 
the top four trading partners with China after Hong Kong, 
the EEC, and Japan. As American journalist Jim Mann 
observed while stationed in China during that period, "at no 
other time in the twentieth century have the institutions of 
Western capitalism sought to do business with and inside a 
Communist state to the extent that they did in China during 
the 1980s" (Mann, 1989, p.22).
It is fair to conclude that during those experimental 
years, American businesses landing in China were largely 
motivated by the encouraging comments from their own 
government and positive image of the Chinese leaders. The 
risk-taking and success-oriented culture of the Americans
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became another contributing factor. In the same way,
Chinese state-owned enterprises were eager to become 
modernized entities within one night. Like almost every 
major business in America rushing to China, every leading 
Chinese industry wanted foreign technology in whatever form. 
Being equipped with foreign technology became a status 
symbol, and a partnership with a Western business meant a 
privileged access to scarce means of production.
However, few of the participants contemplated to what 
extent the Americans rushing to China had been well informed 
of the decisive and crucial roles played by Chinese national 
and local bureaucracies in business. Moreover, was China's 
bureaucracy structured for a planned economy prepared for 
the market mechanisms introduced with foreign technologies? 
Would the technologies that had thrived in the U.S. survive 
in China? The following will address these questions with 
an analysis of the two cases detailed in Chapter One.
B. Encountering Chinese Public Bureaucracy
The two cases demonstrate that American businesses, as 
soon as they landed in China, encountered numerous technical 
bureaucracies operating foreign technology transfers. As a 
matter of fact, ad hoc public agencies, such as the Tianjin 
Center (case 2), were organized at national and local levels 
in the past ten years to handle the swarms of technology 
suppliers from the West.
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Case analysis. One major difficulty experienced by the 
American suppliers in the first case was their 
underestimation of bureaucratic roles in the transfer.
When President Grand led his expedition to Beijing for the 
$50 million bid, he encountered a bureaucratic culture 
foreign to him.
To start with, Grand was unable to comprehend the 
parental relationship between the Beijing bureaucracies and 
the end-user, Northeast. To his understanding, since 
Northeast needed and preferred the technology supplied by 
his corporation, the transfer transaction should be closed 
efficiently. As negotiations with different Chinese 
governmental agencies continued. Grand became more confused 
as which agency was supposed to be accountable and 
responsible for both the technology suppliers and recipient. 
Furthermore, he had no clue why his Chinese counterparts 
were extremely sensitive to price. Finally, the fact that 
the end-user had no authority and decision-power for the 
importation was unheard of to Grand. The frustration was 
complicated by the expressed intention of the end-user: they 
preferred the quality and service provided by Grand's 
corporation to other suppliers such as Japan.
The second case indicates similar problems dealing with 
bureaucracy. What makes it different from the first is that 
the Tianjin Center went through the bureaucratic procedure 
instead of leaving the supplier in the dark. Moreover,
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there was an individual, the assistant manager, who was 
committed to the transaction. To gain a better 
understanding of the impenetrable bureaucratic network 
functioned in both cases, Johnston and Li (1988), in their 
"The Industrial Buying Behavior of People's Republic of 
China" singled out the following behind-the-scene 
bureaucracies that were decision-makers as well as policy- 
implementers.
The Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade 
(MOFERT). MOFERT ranks as one of the highest public 
bureaucracies of China, paralleling the China National 
Planning Committee. The latter controls the national 
industrial budget including the allocation of foreign 
currency for importation. The stated missions of MOFERT 
include: (a) implementing government promulgated principles
and policies on foreign economies and trade; (b) importing 
advanced technologies; and (c) coordinating activities of 
the regional and local foreign trade agencies.
In the case of the $50 million bid, MOFERT, supervised 
the project through its subordinate agencies, such as the 
government-owned foreign trade corporations located in the 
capital.
Foreign Trade Corporations (FTCs). The ten FTCs 
located in Beijing are the secondary public agencies 
balancing China's local and central authority in foreign 
trade, and are divided along product lines. The China
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National Technology Import & Export Corporation directly 
handled the $50 million transfer for a local technology 
recipient. It is also the agency that was bypassed through 
the efforts of Tianjin Center's manager (case 2).
FTCs in Beijing primarily link foreign businesses and 
Chinese end-users. They are also the liaisons between 
foreign business and Beijing government. Westerners are 
often first referred to such bureaucracies before entering 
their target markets. Only those well-informed of China's 
bureaucracy are able to skip this layer. Such was the case 
in the example of BurryKing, which targeted a much smaller 
local bureaucracy in the first place.
Apart from implementing policies from MOFERT, FTCs 
shoulder the responsibility of contracting with foreign 
technology suppliers on behalf of local technology 
recipients. In practice, however, other fragmented public 
bureaucracies have been challenging and competing with FTCs. 
The roles of FTCs have increasingly been taken over by 
individual ministries, such as MMI in the first case, local 
public agencies, such as Tianjin Center in the second case, 
local trading corporations, and even some leading state- 
owned industries such as the Northwest Steel Corporation. 
These bureaucracies have made contact directly with Western 
technology suppliers. Motivations for such a "taking-over" 
are: (a) technologies are transferred more efficiently to
end-users, and (b) required fees charged on technology
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suppliers can be collected by local agencies handling the 
case instead of FTCs in the capital.
Ministry. china has more than fourteen functional 
ministries in Beijing, paralleling the functional 
departments in Washington D.C. such as the Department of 
Commerce. Each ministry has autonomy to initiate and 
complete technology importations depending on the dollar 
value. In the first case, the $50-million project was above 
the cap of importation autonomy, so the Ministry of 
Metallurgy (MMI) had to diffuse its responsibility among 
other agencies. For instance, MMI played the role of a 
treasury agency (with the allocated $50 million budget) to 
its subsidiary, the Northeast Corporation. During the 
negotiation stage, MMI was a liaison and regulator between 
China National Technology Import & Export Corp. and the 
Northeast.
In other situations, however, a ministry has total 
autonomy. For example, in 1985, MMI itself authorized and 
allocated $3 million foreign currency to Northeast for the 
importation of a electronic reading system from the U.S. In 
1987, the MMI led its own team to Montana and transferred 
$2 million mining equipment to its subsidiary. Northeast.
Depending on the dollar amount, a ministry such as MMI 
can play roles from treasurer, business negotiator, 
regulator and contractor for its subsidiary. What is 
unknown by the foreign technology suppliers is the fact that
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some in-house policies are known only to a certain level of 
Chinese bureaucracies. This notion is foreign to Americans 
who have developed faith and respect for publicized 
documents and codes.
Others. The number of parallel public agencies with 
overlapping roles and responsibilities creates an impediment 
to understanding by outsiders, especially action-oriented 
American businesses. The China Council for the Promotion of 
International Trade (CCPIT) can serve as an example.
Located in the capital, CCPIT has affiliates at almost every 
local government (including provinces, municipalities, 
etc.). CCPIT is promoted as an independent agency under the 
jurisdiction of MOFERT. Its business scope includes 
promoting foreign economic and trade ties, concluding 
non-governmental trade agreements with foreign firms, and 
arbitrating economic, trade, and maritime disputes (Johnston 
& Li, 1988, p.3-5). This agency is more of a symbolic than 
a functional task agency.
According to the manager of the Tianjin Center, had the 
process gone according to official rules, the BurryKing case 
would have had to go through many different local 
bureaucracies (including Tianjin Foreign Economy Relations & 
Trade, Tianjin Machinery Imp. & Exp. Corp., Tianjin Council 
for the Promotion of International Trade, etc.). All of 
these are affiliates of central government bureaucracies in 
Beijing.
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Reflection. Given the theoretical and functional roles 
of each technical bureaucracy studied above, diffusion of 
responsibility and accountability for clients is inevitable. 
Such bureaucratic behavior is common to modern bureaucracy 
elsewhere as "modern bureaucracy has become control 
institutions increasingly ruling society, polities and 
government" (Hummel, 1987 p.3).
However, what distinguishes the technical bureaucracies 
in C hina's planned economy from the ones in market economies 
is that each technical bureaucracy in China "handles the 
export and/or imports of a large group of goods and 
services. Domestic enterprises producing exports or using 
imports normally do not deal directly with foreign firms but 
operate through the offices of the foreign trade 
organization that actually carries out the international 
trade transaction" (Robock & Simmonds, 1989 p.334).
Another feature typical of Chinese technical 
bureaucracy is described by Max Weber as that (a task 
agency) once established, and having fulfilled its task, an 
office tends to continue in existence and be held by another 
incumbent (Hummel, 1987). To deal with the newly 
established task agencies as well as the existing structured 
bureaucracy can be one of the dilemmas facing American 
technology suppliers in the future.
C. Lessons Learned; Same Bed, Different Dreams
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After ten years of what some Americans called a "short 
and happy romance", they realized they had been "in the same 
bed but with different dreams" as concerned their Chinese 
partners. The American businesses felt lost in China, 
fooled by the rosy illusions and frustrated by the business 
practices there. Ten years before, the word "China" excited 
literally every American business, but in current literature 
the image of China is overwhelmingly negative. The 
goldfield is now pictured as a ghost town. Following are 
reflections from the American side on their past experiences 
with their Chinese partners.
Incompatible goals. It was not fully realized during 
the gold-rush years that Americans and Chinese had different 
goals and priorities in mind. As mentioned earlier, the 
primary motivation for Americans doing business in China is 
to capture the 1.1 billion person market and maximize 
profit. This illusion of the purchasing power of 1.1 
billion people ignored the reality that eighty percent of 
the population are peasants who have only recently managed 
to live above starvation.
The American government conveyed similar notions to 
business, as when the White House press section forecast 
that Western businesses would earn "megabucks" in China.
The U.S. National Security Advisor, Robert McFarlane 
predicted, in a nationwide television program covering 
Reagan's visit to China, that "perhaps hundreds of thousands
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of Americans and other Westerners" would be going to work in 
China (Mann, 1989, p.306).
Similarly, Chinese leaders had their own goals and 
fantasies to fulfil: the wealthy westerners would bring with 
them the most advanced technologies, China could be equipped 
with sophisticated managerial and technical know-how, and 
the technology suppliers would assist in selling Chinese 
products abroad to earn foreign exchange for China.
Another expectation of the Western technology suppliers 
that developed countries are obligated to share their 
technologies with the poorer nations as mentioned earlier in 
chapter two.
However, few American businesses realized such 
incompatible goals and different perceptions held by both 
governments and businesses of the international technology 
transfer. As a result, by 1989, foreign companies that set 
up operations in China found themselves unable to obtain the 
massive sales or the low cost production of which they had 
dreamed (Mann, 1989, p.24).
In addition, direct American investment comprises only 
about $1 billion out of a total $14.6 billion for all 
foreign investment in China, including offshore oil 
exploration (Pye, 1986). The total number of American 
business personnel and family members in China, by 1989, was 
6,100 (Mann, 1989, p.306).
Correspondingly, Chinese leaders felt that they had
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misjudged, too. Their own expectations of what Western 
businesses might do for China had proved to be unrealistic. 
By the late 198 0s the relationship between Western 
businesses and China was clearly beginning to cool (Mann, 
1989, p . 306). American businesses were no longer so awed by 
the business prospects in China. China, with its current 
$10.4 billion foreign debt accumulated in the past ten years 
from technology importation, had begun to reexamine the 
extent to which it could afford reliance on Western 
technology.
It is not unfair to say that American businesses 
created the illusory image of the Chinese market, based on 
overly optimistic comments made by both governments.
Another contributing factor was the "taken-for-granted" 
attitude of Americans doing businesses abroad, which is 
explained in the following discussion.
Unmatched business practices. The two cases discussed 
earlier indicate that Americans businesses had little 
understanding and knowledge of the crucial roles China's 
bureaucracies played. It was beyond their expectation that 
the entire transfer procedure would be in the control of 
different public bureaucracies, from allocating foreign 
currency for importation, to business negotiation and 
signing contracts. The end-users were out of the scene.
In the same way, Chinese public bureaucracy and the 
state-owned end-users were unprepared for the challenges
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introduced by western technology suppliers, even though the 
economic reform was seen as a daring and radical assault on 
conventional wisdom.
One factor preventing the business practices from 
meshing was the unrealistic expectations brought on by 
incompatible goals. Each party wanted to follow its own 
established norm of conducting business. For instance, AMC 
expected to transfer its "way of doing business" to its 
joint venture located in Beijing. They invited the 
bureaucracies from Beijing to AMC's annual dealer show in 
Las Vegas. Instead of appreciating the marketing techniques 
displayed by MCA, the Beijing delegation accused AMC's 
president, Dedeurwaerder, of his "foolishness". The Chinese 
officials accused Dedeurwaerder of "wasting" the one million 
dollars on the dealer show which could have been invested in 
the joint-venture project in Beijing. By not doing the 
business the Chinese way, the MCA was perceived to be less 
sincere and enthusiastic in establishing the joint venture 
project. Dedeurwaerder, the offended by the mentality of 
the Chinese bureaucrats, finally spelt out his American way: 
"Listen, I won't tell you how to run your Communist system 
if you won't tell me how to run my company" (Mann, 1999,
p. 16) .
Another incompatible goal is illustrated by a comment 
made by an Americans executive doing business in China. He 
complained that "the Chinese wanted our technology but won't
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listen to our management advice. They wanted guns but not 
blue jeans, hardware but not software" (Hendryx, p. 75).
Furthermore, American businesses place the highest 
possible value on economic efficiency , even if it may lead 
to differentials in income or unemployment. Their Chinese 
partners, on the other hand, spent much more time on welfare 
problems, smoothing relationships inside and outside the 
organization etc.. Compared to American management, the 
Chinese management have less delegated autonomy and 
independence in business decision-making. More often than 
not, the real power over individual Chinese business lies 
with officials in each level of bureaucracy such as, the 
municipalities, government ministries, or in the Party 
leadership.
Given the above stated incompatible goals and unmatched 
business practices between the American suppliers and 
Chinese recipients, what could be some alternatives for 
American businesses? How well could private corporations 
of the West survive the bureaucratic operations in the 
China market? The next chapter will conclude the present 
discussion with a focus on some dilemmas facing American 
businesses in the future.
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Chapter Four Different Beds, Overlapping Dreams ?
Given the discussions so far on the US-China technology 
transfer operations, what could be some alternatives for 
American businesses who want to be or have been involved in 
the China market? How likely and to what extent will the 
two economically and politically different systems 
(different beds) be able to work together toward their goals 
(overlapping dreams)? The rest of the paper presents some 
future options conceived by American and Chinese academics.
I will conclude my present study by discussing some of the 
dilemmas facing American businesses in their future 
interaction with the Chinese public bureaucracy.
American Perspectives
Current discussions concerning the US-China business 
operations show different attitudes toward the future. One 
alternative is a full-scale withdrawal from the China 
market. This is recommended by some American consultants 
specializing in Sino-US technology transfers (Fischer,
1988). Another solution favors a "wait-and-see" approach. 
Some American companies already located in China, such as 
AMC, have stopped further investment and will let time take 
care of the procedure.
Their strategies are supported by three arguments. 
First, China is still a nontraditional market even with its
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current economic reform since the market mechanism is 
replaced by administrative control from the central 
government and public bureaucracies. This centralized and 
bureaucratic system is not quite as receptive of Western 
technologies as it has portrayed to the world (Lieberthal & 
Prahalad, 1988).
Second, although China seems malleable from its self- 
imposed image to the West, its inside bureaucracy is 
intractable and endlessly capable of frustrating change 
(Mann, 1989). Its impenetrable "red tape" has caused 
financial loss to Western private businesses (Fistcher,
1988) .
Thirdly, some American companies having gone through 
the Chinese bureaucracies for business operations feel the 
formula "2+2=l/2" is symbolic of a typical technology 
supplier /recipient relationship. It costs twice as much 
and takes twice as long in China to make half the normal 
profits made elsewhere (Johnston & Li, 1988).
It is also predicted that future technology transfers 
from the United States are difficult. Dennis F. Simon of 
Tufts University's Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, 
also a technical consultant with both countries, believes 
that it is not the right timing for China to transfer 
technologies from the United States. According to him, 
"China's desire to establish its presence in the world 
economy by using imported technologies is occurring at an
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unfavorable time because developed countries such as the 
United States take security interests into account and 
increasing global competition has made some firms shy about 
releasing their technology to potential competitors" (Dai, 
1988, p . 59). Others like Richard H. Holton from the 
University of California at Berkeley, conveyed the notion 
that unless China improves its business environment, such as 
removing bureaucratic obstacles from future business 
transactions, the American practitioners are reluctant to 
return (Dai, 1988).
Others take a doing-nothing-approach. They believe 
that what Americans have encountered in China, such as 
bureaucracy, foreign currency problem, unstable environment 
e t c ., "are not necessarily unique to China. They are, 
rather, part of the political process of capitalism mixing 
with communism," and "a similar conflict might well be found 
if Western companies start up Joint ventures in Moscow or 
Leningrad" (Mann, 1989, p.308).
Chinese Perspectives
One problem seen by some Chinese academics in the US- 
China operation is that there has been a lack of mutual 
understanding and respect for the cultural, political, and 
economic differences between China and the United States. 
They also recognize that although businesses from both 
countries have been in active interaction in the past ten
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years, "the effect of the last three decades isolation in 
the "cold war" still exists," and "one's market system, 
business customs, sales channels e t c . are still foreign to 
the other" (Dai, 1988).
Other Chinese specialists hold a positive view for the 
future expanding of the technology transfers from the US to 
China. According to them, the American businesses have a 
high reputation for the technologies China urgently needs, 
such as energy, transportation, telecommunication, and basic 
material industries (Dai, 1988). Other Chinese believe that 
Americans should not give away this market of "cheap labor 
cost" to Japan and European Economic Market.
Chinese leaders made some positive gestures as well. A 
reform-minded Chinese vice premier, Mr. Tian Jiyuen, made 
the following candid speech to the American businessmen and 
academics who were attending the Sino-American Economic 
Cooperation Seminar in July 1988 in Beijing.
Each of us two nations has its own strength 
and great potentials for further cooperation.
There exists a promising future in fields of 
manufacturing, investment, and high technology.
We, Chinese government, are not trying to 
rationalize our unsatisfactory investment 
climates such as poor services low efficiency, red 
tape etc. Those problems, however, are what we 
inherited from history, from the legacy of the 
existing administrative system. It is not that we 
Chinese are no smarter. As a matter of fact, it 
is our goal and endeavor to make change of the 
existing low-efficiency-system and to introduce 
mechanisms of competition to every field (Hong,
1988) .
Apparently, both sides recognized the problems in the
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past and opportunities in the future. However, there also 
exists dilemmas that hinder the accomplishment of each 
other's goals in the future.
Future Dilemmas
Despite dramatic changes in economic areas, China's 
bureaucratic system remains unchallenged. The fact is the 
twelve-year-economic reform (1978-1990) has not changed the 
fundamental nature or structure of China's economic system. 
The state planning apparatus remain firmly in place. The 
economic changes are unable to go as far as the Westerners 
have hoped. To American businesses, it means that they are 
to encounter the following similar situations as they or 
their peers have done in the past ten years.
First, business opportunity and political instability 
are intertwined in the China market. Usually, a 
predictable stable political environment is one of the key 
variables that influence technology suppliers' marketing 
choice. For instance, foreign investment in China was 
strictly decreased in 1987 when China launched a political 
campaign against its intellectuals. However, the Chinese 
government has developed varieties of favorable terms to 
attract foreign technology suppliers even after the Tian An 
Men massacre of June, 1989. China can not afford not to 
adapt advanced technologies in its economic recovery.
Second, conflicts between efficiency-oriented American
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private businesses and process-focused Chinese public 
bureaucracies will resume. It should be recognized that 
Chinese public bureaucracy has been ruled by the Communist 
Party for four decades. Therefore, public bureaucracies are 
accustomed to accommodate their operations to political 
ideology rather than to economic needs. Within such a 
nontraditional market system of China, American businesses 
will have to take advantage of any seemingly favorable 
situations. For example, when the Chinese government is 
reform-oriented, its public agencies tend to be more 
economic-efficiency oriented. In general, regardless of 
political situations, the bloated bureaucracy continues to 
overregulate everything within its reach in China.
The third dilemma shows that competition will be 
continued between newly established task agencies, such as 
the Tianjin Center in the second case, and structured 
governmental bureaucracies in attracting foreign technology 
suppliers. Specifically, the national government spells out 
tasks that various subordinate units are supposed to do. 
However, the fragmented subordinate agencies may have the 
task done not according to administrative laws or 
regulations, but through negotiations between the central 
and local governing bodies, and between government 
departments and subordinate enterprises. To Western 
technology suppliers, it will mean more confusion and 
expenditure of time and energy. It will be the Westerners
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responsibility to figure out which agency has the decision­
making power and who tends to be more productive. This 
dilemma brings forward another difficulty.
Finally, business and personal relationship are always 
overlapping with each other in China's business environment. 
Americans who are accustomed to abiding business codes and 
laws find it difficult to accept and accommodate. However, 
due to the Chinese cultural norms, plus the scarce material 
supplies needed for production, the development of personal 
relationships with bureaucracies and bureaucracies becomes 
an indicator measuring business success. In some case, 
what may seem to be bribery to Americans might be an 
accepted business ritual or a fringe benefit to a contract.
As compared to American bureaucracy, the Chinese public 
bureaucracy has autonomic power over individual business. 
Such power breeds privilege and is not easily abandoned.
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CONCLUSION
In international market, American technology suppliers 
seem to be naive in business operations when compared to 
others such as the Japanese. However, Americans have 
impressed their Chinese partners with their integrity and 
sound business credit. The following comments made by the 
assistant manager of Tianjin Center (case 2) illustrate the 
reasons:
Under similar conditions, we would rather 
enter into business with American technology 
suppliers. Not only do they provide quality 
technology but also demonstrate integrity in doing 
business. Generally speaking, they are honest, 
straight forward and ethical as compared to some 
Japanese technology suppliers. An American 'yes' 
means it and a 'no' excludes tricks or mind games.
In addition, because American businesses 
value their credit, they would not dump inferior 
products or technology to their Chinese customers 
for short-term profit. In this sense, American 
businesses are more ethical and long-term oriented 
than Japanese technology suppliers in the Chinese 
market (F. Li, personal interview with assistant 
manager of Tianjin Center, June 10, 1990) .
The question is what could Americans have done to
better use the advantages and positive images they have
established in the Chinese market? Furthermore, what
strategies can American technology suppliers employ in their
future operations in China to better survive China's public
bureaucracy? The author, based on the case analysis
discussed earlier, her past work experience with Chinese
public bureaucracies, as well as American technology
suppliers and selected literature research, suggests the
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following coping strategies for American businesses who want 
to sell their technologies to Chinese customers.
A. Seeking Cooperation from U.S. Governmental Agencies
What makes American private businesses successful at 
home, such as their "lone wolf" strategy, may not be 
receptive in an environment where public bureaucracy and 
state-owned enterprises are of prestigious status. Having 
American individual business dealing with the layers of 
Chinese public bureaucracies is like a single soldier 
fighting a whole battalion, or a curiosity-driven child 
getting lost in a "mystery palace".
The rationale of encouraging the evolvement of American 
governmental agencies in the Sino-U.S. technology transfer 
is three-fold. First, business communications between same 
level public agencies, such as between the Department of 
Commerce in Washington D.C. and the Ministry of Trade & 
Economic Development in Beijing, create an atmosphere of 
equality, sincerity and mutual trust in business 
transactions. China, a more hierarchical society than the 
United Stated, emphasizes formality, courtesy, ceremony and 
cultural rituals in international business operations. 
Moreover, China is not yet accustomed to the market 
mechanisms such as the existence of private business. It is 
common and acceptable to the Chinese public that 
bureaucracies, especially those empowered with decision-
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making autonomy, enjoy privileged status over private 
business and carders (bureaucrats) versus business people. 
Similarly, state-subsidiary enterprises are superior to 
collective-owned or private businesses.
Another rationale behind is that the concept and 
practice of private business have not yet been well 
acknowledged and accepted by the Chinese public. The 
practice of private business had been eliminated and 
forbidden until early 1980s when the current economic reform 
was expanded to urban industries. Given this historical 
factor, it is not uncommon that the existence of the private 
business or entrepreneur provokes the image of "profit- 
seeker" while Chinese public agencies are that of "office- 
seekers" .
The third rationale lies in the assumption that, by 
utilizing specialized governmental agencies in business 
coordination, individual American technology suppliers can 
minimize their administrative costs and personnel input in 
the Chinese market.
Governmental involvement can take many forms. Instead 
of having each individual business go to explore and deal 
with layers of Chinese public bureaucracy, an American 
governmental agency may operate a liaison headquarter in 
China to coordinate Chinese public bureaucracies with 
American individual business. The Japanese has used such 
strategy to fit into China's political and economic
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structures in order to achieve their economic goals. For 
example, during the mid-1980s when China's economic reform 
was at its prime, a business representative from the 
government of Kobei, an industrial city in Japan, was sent 
to Tianjin, the sister city of Kobei. According to the 
representative, his major responsibility was to coordinate 
private Japanese businesses from Kobei in their transactions 
with local Chinese public bureaucracies. He functioned as a 
liaison, public relationship agent, information collector 
and, above all, symbol of Kobei. The Tianjin government, in 
turn, offered favorable business terms to the Japanese 
businesses (F. Li, personal conversation with the Japanese 
representative in Tianjin, China, May 26, 1985).
B. Targeting the Right Chinese Public Agency
What differs the business practice between the Grand's 
team (case 1) and the BurryKing's (case 2) in their Chinese 
operation is that the latter, instead of following a routine 
bureaucratic procedure, targeted an efficient functional 
public agency. The writer summarizes three major indicators 
that help American technology suppliers to identify and 
distinguish from a right public agency to an inappropriate 
o n e .
Profile of science & technology committee. First of 
all, the target agency should be within the system of China 
Science & Technology Committee (CST, located in Beijing).
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In another word^ if the target agency is a branch or 
subordinate of CST, such as the local science and technology 
committee institutionalized in each major industrial city, 
redundant procedures can be minimized due to the 
advantageous position of CST in China's economic reform.
One of the favorable situations for CST and its 
branches is, because of their expertise status, technical 
competence as well as their adversary and functional 
relations with key governmental agencies, they are delegated 
more autonomy and decision-making power other eligible 
agencies mentioned earlier. In the second case, the 
technical branch of CST, Tianjin Science & Technology 
Committee has its autonomy to import BurryKing's technology 
through its task agency, Tianjin Center.
In addition, a local science and technology committee, 
a direct subordinate of the municipal government, usually 
has the delegated authority in the management of human 
resources and business activities. For example, Tianjin 
center used the support provided by Tianjin government, its 
mass media, personnel staff, etc., to organize the 
information conference where American technology suppliers 
and potential Chinese end-users were introduced.
Profile of local public agency. The second indicator 
underlines whether the agency has the informal power to 
influence executive decision-making procedures and outcome. 
It is equally important that it is delegated total
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implementation authority. The second case illustrated that 
it was the task agency, Tianjin Center, that actually took 
the initiation to import the technology, conceived sound 
proposals and alternatives for its executive agency, TSTC. 
The task agency concluded the transfer by itself on behalf 
of both TSTC and individual technology recipient ( F. Li, 
personal interview with the assistant manager of Tianjin 
Center, June 10, 1990).
Profile of public agent. The third significant 
measurement of a right choice is whether the agency has an 
influential and all-round performer. It is typical, when 
operating in the Chinese business environment, that a smooth 
and harmonious personal relationship with key bureaucracies 
can make a transaction far more efficient and effective than 
simply following written rules. According to the assistant 
manager of Tianjin Center (F. Li, personal conversation with 
the assistant manager, June 10, 1990), such a "Mr. Right" 
agent should demonstrate competence in, at least, the 
following three areas.
The agent, apart from personal integrity, needs to be 
in the management position of the agency, preferably next to 
the executive manager. In most Chinese organizations, the 
management next to the executive, i.e. assistant manager or 
vice manager as the Chinese call it, is usually held 
accountable to business operations and business decision­
makings. The executive manager is responsible for overall
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
66
accountable to business operations and business decision­
makings. The executive manager is responsible for overall 
organizational planning and personnel.
Apart from holding a management position, the agent 
should demonstrate the capability of initiating business 
proposals with sufficient expertise knowledge of the 
technology being imported. Also required is the agent's 
familiarity with bureaucratic operations. Take the second 
case for example, the assistant manager of Tianjin Center, 
holding a science degree in engineering, was capable of 
conducting feasibility studies before presenting his 
importation proposal to TSCC and Tianjin government.
Finally, the agent must be a veteran public bureaucrat 
able to smooth operations among superior, parallel and 
subordinate public agencies. The past work experience in 
the public bureaucratic system will enable the agent to get 
around unnecessary agencies.
In short, a public agent, possessing the above stated 
three qualities plus English proficiency, will have 
considerable informal influence on Chinese bureaucratic 
decision-making procedures and outcomes.
C. Discovering Informal Information Channels
Americans, accustomed to formal information channels 
such as governmental regulations and business codes, may 
find the formal channels in the Chinese environment less
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functional than what they have assumed. In the field of 
technology transfer, the formal channels are characterized 
by structured organizations and their stated functions as 
described in chapter two.
One contributing factor to the American business' 
ignorance of Chinese informal channels is their valued 
"American way". According Crow's (Grow, 1988) cross-culture 
research, about 72% of the large American firms surveyed 
sought information from the U.S. Department of Commerce to 
make their China operation decisions. Moreover, American 
managers took for granted that administrative decree or 
bureaucratic fiat would "untangle the Chinese web of rules 
and regulations" (Grown, 1988, p.31).
The American way exercised by the Grand's team (case 1) 
was to rely solely on information provided by the technical 
agencies. Without using informal channels, they were kept 
in the dark regarding the pricing and negotiation procedures 
until two years later. Their Japanese counterparts, 
however, took every opportunity to socialize informally with 
end-users, related bureaucrats, agencies concerned and even 
decision-making personnel in order to collect inside 
information and thus try to influence decision-makings.
BurryKing (case 2), on the other hand, employed a 
bilingual American Chinese to develop human relationship 
with Tianjin Center. With the informal relationship 
healthily established, BurryKing was able to trust and be
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dependent on Tianjin Center for its suggestions and 
management. In turn, BurryKing's effort of using informal 
channels was rewarded with an extended contract.
Informal channels in the context of China-Western 
business operations can be identified as the following: (a)
what is not said in formal business negotiations; (b), 
information unavailable from public record but from key 
bureaucrats or business translators; (c) advice, suggestions 
and interpretation provided by an individual agent; (d) 
personal relationship with end-users and a key agent ; and 
(e) information in local newspapers.
Informal information channels are especially important 
to Western technology suppliers because of the instability 
and constant change in China's current transitional phase 
from government controlled economy to market economy. 
American businesses, in their endeavor to discover and make 
full use of the informal channels in their Chinese business 
operations, will face challenges from their language and 
cultural disparities as discussed in the following.
D. Acquiring High-Context Culture Communication Skills
Americans are proud of and highly value their 
individualistic-oriented behavior and the pursue of 
openness, fairness and equality in business competition. 
However, Americans are perceived to be naive in doing so in 
some "high-context" cultures such as China, Japan and Korea.
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The high-context culture in business communications, 
especially between foreign businesses and local Chinese 
businesses, is featured by indirectness, vagueness, 
formality, courtesy and others-oriented. The negotiation 
style used is more receiver—oriented than sender—oriented as 
it is the listener's responsibility to figure out the hidden 
meanings implied in the sender's message for the sake of 
saving face.
Low-context culture, as that of American and some 
European countries', is identifiable through (a) the 
explicit and precise communication as if between man and 
computer; (b) the speaker-oriented negotiation style which 
holds the message-sender accountable for the accuracy of 
message; (c) the obedience to laws and business codes; and 
(d) standardized measurement of business performance.
Influenced by their low-context culture, the American 
business in the Chinese market tend to repeat business 
practices exercised at home. For example, they may take for 
granted that by investing costly in advertising, they will 
be able to market their first class technology in the 
Chinese markets. Their Japanese rivals would invest equally 
in advertising and human relationship building because they 
are better aware of the fact that "the Chinese top decision­
makers are not interested in reading or watching 
advertisement while the interested (i.e. end-users) has no 
decision-making powers over importation and foreign currency
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allocation” ( F. Li, personal interview with the assistant
manager of Tianjin Center, June 10, 1990).
In the transfer of foreign technology to China, a
Chinese technical agency would explore all possible means
that are not spelt out in written forms instead of following
what has been imposed by the government. When governmental
policies favor market economy, the Chinese would run as fast
as they could as if rushing through the green traffic light.
Accordingly, they would try every means to get around in
stead of stopping when the light turns red. Put it another
way, governmental policies and business codes respected by
Westerners can be interpreted differently or got around by
local Chinese agencies or agents without being caught.
The above described business behaviors in high-context
cultures is true to East Asian countries such as Japan,
Korea, China, and some Middle East countries(Chu, 1989; Jin,
1989; June, 1989; & Li, 1990). The following statement
conveyed the frustration experienced by some American
executives doing business in China. It also indicates that
some cultural rituals considered to be the "prerequisite" by
people from a high-context culture for further business
operations are not yet receptive to Americans.
When doing business in China, we (Americans) 
notice that Japanese frequently propose toast (the 
cultural rituals practiced by Japanese to promote 
warm human relationship prior to business 
negotiations) to their Chinese clients. We have 
no clue what those Japanese are up to. We see 
Chinese holding banquets for us from the beginning 
of our business negotiations to the end and we
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know more often than not nothing may be 
accomplished. We Americans do business first and 
"Gan-bei" (proposing toast) in the end (Li, 1990).
To conclude this study on the Chinese bureaucratic 
behavior in technology transfers, the writer advocates an 
incremental reform of China's public bureaucracy. The 
existing system does not encourage the transfer of foreign 
technology, which has hindered China's further economic 
development. However, before such an ideal revolution 
occurs, American businesses have to develop strategies so 
that they can, as suggested in a military strategy conceived 
by General Sun Tzu in 500 B.C., "know yourself, know your 
rivals, hundred battles, hundred victories" (Chu,1989).
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